Federal solar procurement policy shifts focus from “Buy American” to “Don’t Buy Chinese”

The federal government is shifting its approach to solar procurement, placing a stronger emphasis on avoiding equipment from China and other foreign entities of concern rather than simply promoting domestic manufacturing. This change reflects evolving national security priorities approved by Congress and signed into law in late 2025. (Solar Power World)

For decades, U.S. public projects funded with federal dollars have included “Buy American” requirements that prioritize American-made iron, steel, manufactured goods and construction materials. Under the Build America Buy America Act of 2021, agencies must use products with at least 55 percent of production costs traced to the United States to qualify for federal funds. However, meeting this threshold has proven difficult for solar panels, inverters and batteries, even as domestic solar manufacturing capacity expands. 

Because of this challenge, agencies have relied on waiver options when U.S. products are unavailable. For example, the Department of Energy applied for a waiver to use inverters with automatic-shutdown capabilities in a project in Alaska, citing the nonavailability of qualifying domestic equipment. In another case, the U.S. Army received a waiver last year to use non-domestic solar panels for a National Guard Readiness Center in Nevada because no suitable American-made panels were available.

Shift toward Non-China requirements

The new focus for government solar projects is not simply domestic content, but specifically avoiding solar products from China and other foreign entities deemed a concern. Federal agencies are now interpreting and adapting to rules on “foreign entities of concern,” or FEOCs, in project procurement. The exact guidelines for private projects remain under development, but some federal agencies are already expected to comply with FEOC restrictions. 

On Dec. 18, 2025, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which includes a provision preventing the Department of War, formerly the Department of Defense, from purchasing solar panels, inverters or similar technology from FEOCs. China, Iran, North Korea and Russia are currently listed as FEOCs. The statute allows exceptions if no alternative suppliers are available or if the department determines there is no national security risk. The restriction applies only to federal procurement and does not extend to privately financed installations. 

Industry and congressional reaction

Despite the new statutory language, agencies have not yet issued detailed policies on how to comply with FEOC restrictions. This has drawn concern from lawmakers who want clarity on how federal renewable energy projects will be executed under the rules. In January, a group of Republican members of Congress, including Rep. Stephanie Bice of Oklahoma, sent a letter to Department of War Secretary Pete Hegseth, urging the department to develop specific policies on the national security risks posed by Chinese energy infrastructure. The letter referenced earlier claims that some solar inverters contained rogue communications devices, a concern the Department of Energy later said had not been confirmed. 

Industry officials are still trying to interpret the new focus. Some see the effort as a clear signal that China’s role in global solar manufacturing will be limited in federal projects going forward. Others note that many non-Chinese options already exist and that federal solar development is continuing with products that would meet expected FEOC standards. For instance, engineers on the Alaska project cited above requested German-made inverters that would comply with both domestic and FEOC expectations. 

Broader Implications

The shift from “Buy American” to “Don’t Buy Chinese” reflects broader geopolitical tensions and heightened focus on supply chain security. China dominates global solar manufacturing, with the majority of equipment and components originating there or in countries linked to Chinese firms. While some congressional members view restrictions as essential to protecting national security, others warn that limiting access to lower-cost foreign equipment could slow solar deployment or raise costs for government renewable energy projects. 

For now, agencies continue to install solar and storage systems using available components while awaiting clearer FEOC procurement rules. The outcome of this evolving policy will shape the federal government’s solar plans and could influence broader trends in the U.S. clean energy supply chain.